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Abstract
In the following study, the author examines how Hungary, as part of the European Union, 
builds and seeks switching points with the Arab world, bearing in mind the conflicts 
in the emerging Middle East and North African countries. It focuses on the possibility 
of dialogue, with particular regard to diplomatic negotiations and humanitarian aid. 
It also examines whether Hungary has a special role to play in this process or whether 
the relationship with the EU and the Arab world will be stabilised and shifted in the 
direction of reconciliation.
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Absztrakt
A szerző azt vizsgálja, hogy Magyarország, az Európai Unió részeként, milyen módon 
épít és keres kapcsolódó pontokat az arab világgal, a felmerülő Közel Keleti és Észak 
Afrikai országokon belüli konfliktusokat is szem előtt tartva. A párbeszéd lehetőségére 
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helyezi a hangsúlyt, különös tekintettel a diplomáciai tárgyalásokra és a humanitárius 
segítségnyújtásra. Vizsgálja azt is, hogy Magyarországnak ebben a folyamatban van-e, 
vagy lehet-e speciális szerepe, hogy az EU és az arab világgal a kapcsolat stabilizálódjon, 
illetve ezekben az országokban a megbékélés irányába lépések történjenek.
Kulcsszavak: konfliktusok, párbeszéd, arab világ, Közel-Kelet, Észak-Afrika, üldözött 
keresztények
Starting Point
In my analysis I should like to focus on the opportunities for the European Union, 
of which Hungary is also a part, to seek and build links with North African, Middle 
Eastern and Asian Arabic countries. I should like to place great emphasis on the oppor-
tunities for dialogue, with particular regard to diplomatic negotiations. In addition, 
I will examine if Hungary has or can have a special role in the EU and in the North 
African, Middle Eastern and Asian Arabic countries so that the relationships could be 
stabilised in these countries and steps could be taken towards reconciliation. From 
the point of view of migration policy, the interests of the EU and Hungary differ. The 
EU lays stress primarily on inclusion, whereas Hungary favours assistance tailored to 
the local conditions of a given country.
Islamic Modernism Following a Western Pattern
In the course of history, it was the Napoleonic expansion at the end of the 18th century 
that first turned the attention to the underdevelopment of North Africa (and the 
Middle East in a broader sense). This resulted in an almost immediate introduction 
of reforms in the region under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, at 
the same time, contemporary theoreticians started to find answers to the problems.
In the 19th century, Jamal al-Dín al-Afghání (1839–1897) and Muhammad Abduh 
(1845–1905) were the fathers of the local reform movements, i.e. both of the Islamic 
modernism decisive in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century and of 
the Islamic fundamentalism starting in the second half of the 20th century. According 
to the teachings of Afghání and Abduh, the expected breakthrough could be realised 
by applying the European model, with due consideration, to the local circumstances. 
This kind of ‘modern’ thinking seemed to find its followers.
For the first generation of reform movements, i.e. Islamic modernism, it was 
the West which was set as an absolute example. This period saw the flourishment 
of the Arabic nationalisms, as well as the Arabic unification struggles. According to 
the premise of the modernisation theory, parallel with the development (indus-
trialisation, urbanisation etc.), western institutions are also emerging in the given 
country and democracy becomes a general rule of the game. Because, according 
to the  modernisation theory, by attaining a medium level of income, the economic 
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prerequisites of democratic rearrangement are achieved.2 As a matter of fact, coin-
ciding with this, there was also an opposition in the Arabic world against the West. 
Possibly the most famous grouping based on Islamic fundamentalism, the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement, was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Sayyid Qutb and Ahmad 
Hassan al-Banná. As its leading theoreticians, they have had a great impact on the 
present history of North Africa. They both criticised the West and aimed for the 
Islamisation of the political system and the society.3 The turnaround in the relationship 
to the West, however, was triggered by the 6-day war in 1967 when Israel completely 
defeated three Muslim countries: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. This made apparent the 
contradictions hidden in the uncritical copying of Western patterns. The attempt to 
transplant nationalism, capitalism, and socialism (and other Western achievements) 
ended in a failure.
From the end of the 1960s, a second-generation reform movement set out: 
Islamic fundamentalism, whose most important objective is to reintegrate religion 
into politics; the fundamental pillar being that Islam can be the only solution to 
problems. It has since been proven that this line has not achieved the desired effects 
in the region, either.
Description of the Situation
For Europe – and for Hungary – North Africa has an unquestionable significance from 
the point of view of security policy, economy (market opportunity and raw material 
exporter), and tourism. In today’s world of globalisation, conflicts, which earlier 
seemed to happen in a distant region, now have become close and could have an 
impact on our region. From a security policy perspective, it gives cause for concern 
that in the Madrid attack of March 11, 2004 some of the perpetrators were identified 
as people from the Maghreb area.
Is that region really the hotbed of terrorism? Is it true that the local dictators 
trample on human rights everywhere? Is there no hope for introducing democratic 
institutions? In the following, I seek to answer these questions.
From an economic and touristic aspect, the Middle East is a similarly important 
partner of the EU and of Hungary. Israel has an outstanding geopolitical role here, so, it 
is by far not indifferent what the leadership is like in the surrounding Arabic countries.
Concerning the Asian Arabic countries, we can speak about economic rather than 
touristic relations – the only exception being the United Arab Emirates.
I separate economic and touristic relations for security policy reasons, since 
in economic relations ‘only’ business people are involved who live in a country for 
several years – in a fortunate case with their families. But, in countries with touris-
tic relations, the EU has to face a much greater hazard when a civil war breaks out 
as a relatively higher number of its citizens stay there. We should not forget about 
2 Csicsmann László: Iszlám és modernizáció a Közel-Keleten. Az államiság eltérő modelljei, in: Csicsmann László (ed.): 
A Közel-Kelet demokratizálódásának esélyei a 21. században, Aula, Budapest, 2010, 90. www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/
SOMRRX/2010_91_iszlám%20és%20modernizáció.pdf (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
3 Benke József: Az arabok története, Alexandra, Budapest, 1997, 381.
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cultural relations either. A number of European countries have bilateral agreements 
on education and culture with a number of countries from the Arabic world. Hungary 
has a traditionally good relationship with Egypt through e.g. the Cairo-based Office 
of the Hungarian Cultural Counsellor. We have to re-evaluate our opportunities 
with regard to the present crisis situation. From this time on, Libya will never be the 
same country as before, and the same applies to Tunisia and/or Egypt. The Gulf War 
changed Kuwait, too, in 1991. The Kuwaiti emirate re-evaluated itself and the losses 
made the leadership think over things.
Pope Francis went on an official visit to Abu Dhabi on the first week of February 
2019.4 On two major occasions during his three-day visit in the United Arab Emirates, 
he called his believers’ attention to promote the dialogue between religions, to 
strengthen the Muslim–Christian relationships, and to follow Jesus’ teaching. The 
Head of the Catholic Church did not call for only the promotion of dialogue; he cannot 
forget about the millions of Christians driven away from the region either. Pope Francis 
sought to emphasise the need for the inter-religious dialogue to avert international 
conflicts by evoking Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount. On the last day of his three-day 
visit in the United Arab Emirates, the leader of the Catholic Church celebrated an 
open-air mass for 135 thousand people in the biggest stadium of Abu-Dhabi, the 
capital of the country situated on the Arab Peninsula.
Out of the 9.5 million inhabitants of the Sunni Arabic monarchy, some 90 percent 
are guest workers. About 2.5 million of them are Catholics mostly coming from the 
Philippines and India. Pope Francis apparently addressed primarily them when he spoke 
about the obvious difficulties of living far away from home, missing the affection of 
the loved ones and perhaps also feeling uncertainty about the future.5
Demonstrations and Their Aftermath – What is to Come?
The demonstrations started in December 2010 in Tunisia and spread from there to 
Egypt. We have heard about similar actions in Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, and Algeria. 
From this point of view, Egypt requires particular attention as it has the biggest popu-
lation and the greatest cultural radiance among the Arabic countries. Its geostrategic 
position is very important, moreover, it is the most important Arabic military partner 
of the United States.
The question is what the main cause of this process was. The above written 
could partly give an answer, but there is also something else in the background. In 
general, we can mention the social and economic conditions characteristic of the 
countries concerned. Both in Tunisia and Egypt there is a very high unemployment 
rate. In Tunisia, it is officially 14.1 percent, but according to non-official data it is 24–25 
percent. In Egypt, officially 10 percent of the active population is unemployed, but 
4 Pope Francis celebrated Holy Mass in Abu Dhabi: May your communities be oases of peace. http://press.vatican.va/
content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2019/02/05/190205b.html (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
5 Pope Francis holds first Papal Mass in Abu Dhabi https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/pope-francis-holds-
papal-mass-abu-dhabi-190205065039040.html (Downloaded 30. 03. 2019.)
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actually there are many more jobseekers. It is especially important to mention that half 
of the soon 100-million Egyptian population lives near or below the poverty line, and 
there is frequent news about corruption. It is also a rather severe problem that many 
university graduates are unable to find a livelihood. The chain of the Tunisian events 
was triggered by a young man’s suicide, committed in utter despair on December 17, 
2010, leading to the fall of President Ben Ali on January 14, 2011.
In these societies, the political systems have a very narrow playing field, which 
also necessitates change. We can, though, detect significant differences between 
the events and their antecedents taken (and now taking) place in the two countries. 
While in Tunisia the Islamic powers were “decapitated”, the most influential Islamic 
grouping in Egypt enjoyed semi-legal status and the support of a good part of the 
population.
In addition, there are substantial differences between the armies of the two 
 countries. Tunisia maintains an armed force of 36 thousand, of which land forces are 
not more than 30 thousand. The number of security forces is many times the number 
of the army, which had not been too intensely developed in the past years. Contrary to 
this, Egypt has the strongest army in the region (at least in Arabic  relations)  consisting 
of 468 thousand people, and the number of land forces is above 340 thousand. 
Furthermore, the strength of internal security forces is also significant.
On February 11, 2011, President Mubarak resigned, and the power was taken over 
temporarily, for the presidential election process (for half a year), by the army. In July 
2013, Commander-in-Chief el-Sisi became the leader of the country, who, with the 
help of the army, took the power away from the Islamists who had won the elec-
tions.6 Six weeks after the military takeover, the security forces crushed the sit-down 
strike of the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, then banned the whole Islamist 
opposition and jailed many of its leaders. Later on, the reckoning was extended to 
other groups of the opposition.
In Libya there are several opposition groupings. The past haunts, as Gaddafi had 
started in 1969 from Benghazi not far from the Egyptian border, and now demon-
strations started at the same place. The moves got so intense as to disrupt the unity 
of the Libyan leaders and many soldiers started to support the rebels. At present, 
there are two governments in Libya, one in Benghazi, and one in Tripoli. International 
organisations acknowledge the Tripoli Government. There have been several efforts 
under international pressure to harmonise the two governments with not much 
success for the time being. Negotiations between the two governments have been 
being promoted by the UNO since 2015, with more or less success. The goal is the 
establishment of a temporary united government.7
6 Kiábrándultság és megélhetési gondok – Egyiptom öt évvel a forradalom után, 2016. https://hu.euronews.com/2016/01/25/
kiabrandultsag-es-megelhetesi-gondok-egyiptom-ot-evvel-a-forradalom-utan (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
7 Gugán Dániel: Líbia – az „elfelejtett polgárháború” és annak migrációs vetülete, Nemzet és Biztonság, 9 (2016/5) 7. 
www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2016_5_03_gugan_daniel_-_libia-az_elfelejtett_polgarhaboru_es_annak_mig-
racios_vetulete.pdf (Downloaded:16.02.2019.)
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Possibilities of Dialogue with Arabic Countries
The question is raised: how should the EU and Hungary relate to the Arabic coun-
tries? The EU, and particularly Italy, gets a remarkable amount of oil from Libya. This 
means that 32 percent of the oil produced in Libya flows to Italy. Libyan oil is of rather 
high quality – that is why the EU buys it. Oil prices have been getting higher and 
higher since the Libyan conflicts. For energy policy reasons, the EU wants to reduce 
its dependence on Russia, and, consequently is seeking other sources, as well. It is also 
in Hungary’s interest to diversify its energy sources. Hungary had a traditionally good 
relationship with Libya. A lot of Hungarian doctors worked for decades in Libya and 
Kuwait. We must investigate what linking points are given to build new connections 
with Arabic countries – especially Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya – in the future. In Tunisia 
or Egypt, the old president is no longer in office. Gaddafi unfolded his theory con-
cerning the role of political institutions in his so-called Green Book. He made it clear, 
for example, that modern political parties are unsuitable to vindicate the interests 
of the people. In the official name of the country there was jamahiriya (“immediate 
power of the masses”), but in fact the country was a special totalitarian republic.8 It 
shows similar traits with the earlier Arabic socialisms, inasmuch so that in its rhetoric 
it is left-wing and it builds on the immediate participation of the people.
Before the second half of the 1990s, the relationship between Libya and the West 
had not been perfect, but the decrease in oil prices resulted in a kind of consolidation, 
bridge-building on the part of Gaddafi, and, as a result, in May 2010 Libya was struck 
off the list of countries supporting terrorism. After the death of Gaddafi, Libya would 
not be the same as it had been for 41 years.
The EU needs oil. So, the question is what shall we do when a new Libyan 
 government is formed which may put fundamentalist thinking more in the front than 
before? In my view, Europe should show a picture of stability. Speaking about Europe, 
we use the word “West” when we make comparisons with Islam. And under the term 
“West”, we mean not only Europe and the United States, but also Christianity. The 
Islamic Arabic world is populated primarily by Muslims. Actually, there are countries 
where there are a number of Christians e.g. Egypt, Jordan, Syria or Algeria. The inter-
religious dialogue now seems to have failed to deliver on its hopes. When speaking 
about new dialogue, we cannot omit religion. In the Islamic thinking, Christians 
belong to the “people of the Book”. This shows a kind of respect on their part. Many 
think that they must approach the Arabic world as ideologically neutral. They are 
mistaken! When at a negotiation, a Christian person approaches an Arabic (Muslim) 
negotiating partner on the basis of the Christian value system, then the Muslim  person 
behaves respectfully – similar to our behaviour towards him. In my opinion, we should 
not think like this: “As we need oil, we should do for the oil whatever, say, the new 
Libyan government asks us to do.” This way of thinking does not lead forward. On 
the contrary, it is doomed to fail. Countries rich in oil, e.g. Libya, do not give oil out 
of love, but for money, much money. If they need the money and the EU needs the 
oil, then it can lead to correct and balanced working and economic relations. Though 
8 Rostoványi Zsolt: Az iszlám a 21. század küszöbén, Aula, Budapest, 1998, 186.
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Hungary is not a big country, it has had traditionally good relations with Arabic 
countries. What is the reason for that? I see one of the causes in the Hungarian way 
of thinking and in their reliable and high-level professional skills. In the Hungarian 
character, there is a kind of particular empathy, which can hardly be found in other 
nations. And it is noticed and esteemed by the Arabic people. The former communist 
countries of Central Europe can serve as models for the nations of North Africa and 
the Middle East in their struggle for democracy and freedom of opinion and expres-
sion, said NATO Secretary General at a Warsaw conference.9 So, I think, it is politics, 
economy, culture (education), health care, sports, and mutual respect for religious 
values through which we can connect to the Arabic world. Our future relations with 
the Arabic countries which want new governments and democracy should stand on 
these new foundations and should build these connections. We should not be afraid 
of religion, as religion and political functions are amalgamated in Islam – this is the 
essence of organic religion. It is no longer the case in Europe, and it seems strange to 
the Arabic world, but it is similarly strange to us that the people itself requires Shi’ite 
and Sunni leaders in the parliament and in the government.
There are a lot of questions that the West has not been able to make clear. One of 
them is, whether the NATO and EU forces should intervene in Libya or not. The NATO 
Secretary General has confirmed that the NATO will intervene militarily in Libya only 
by the authorisation of the UN and by strong local support.10 For the time being, it 
seems that the Libyans want to settle their future themselves, either from the part 
of the government or from the part of the rebelling people. I think that the will of the 
people is important and that they should be given the chance to try and settle their 
own lives. We have seen the results of the military interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq which sadly means that, since the ‘end’ of the war, more people have died than 
during the pre-war reign of the dictatorial government and during the war altogether. 
This is precisely why we have to be careful with such outer military interventions. Let 
us not forget that a negative concomitant of a war is, for all the precise weapons, that 
it takes a great toll on the civilian population.11
The people of the concerned Arabic countries and the international public are 
both eager to see what the future will bring after the civil wars.
Migration Agreement in Progress
The inner EU regulations of migration have significant historical antecedents. The 
European regulation of migration has continuously been on the agenda since the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951. At that time, ‘migration’ 
was understood as the free movement of labour force of the six founding states on 
9 NATO Secretary General: Közép-Európa modellként szolgálhat Észak-Afrika számára, 2011. https://hvg.hu/vi-
lag/20110317_NATO_fotitkar_eszak_afrika (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
10 Ibid.
11 Harai Dénes: Az erőszak kultusza és a civilizáció védelme. (A terrorizmus elleni küzdelem társadalmi, társadalom-
tudományi kérdései.) Manuscript, ZMNE, 2008, 7.
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the common labour market. With the acceptance of the Schengen Agreement12 
in 1985, it has had a firm legal foundation. However, today, the term migration is 
more and more understood in the EU as the movement of non-EU (third-country) 
citizens from outside into the EU. Its most urgent point on the agenda today is the 
common European regulation of the reception of asylum-seekers. But its common 
European regulation is far from being properly elaborated. The Dublin Regulation 
of 1990 currently in force and the Dublin III Regulation13 aimed at reforming the 
previous one, defines the responsibility of the EU member states in the examination 
of the applications for asylum, but a comprehensive, single, all-European regulation 
for asylum seeking, which is in accordance with the international conventions, has 
not been established till this very day. The 2015 migration crisis abruptly brought 
this deficiency to the surface; making it an acute problem and turning on a kind of 
improvised ‘fire-fighting’ in the European legislature.
On November 12, 2015, at the end of the two-day summit in Malta,14 EU officials 
announced that the Union will offer a deal to Turkey, according to which the EU gives 
+ 3 billion Euros to support the country’s endeavours to keep the 2 million Syrian 
refugees ‘local’ and restrain them from migrating on further to the EU. After all, the 
deal was, with further allowances, accepted by Turkey. The agreement between the EU 
and Turkey came into effect on March 20, 2016, and it obliges Turkey to receive back 
migrants who arrive illegally from Turkey to Greece.15 This agreement afforded some 
time to the EU since they succeeded in, even though temporarily, ‘freezing’ the Eastern 
Mediterranean migration route. But, the (temporary) ‘solution’ of the eastern route 
did not advance the position of Italy, which lies in the centre of the southern route – in 
fact, it worsened it. For the handling of the migration coming from North Africa across 
Libya, there have been no solution propositions similar to the Turkey deal. The border 
protection solutions of military character (Mare Nostrum,16 Triton17 and the Sophia 
interventions) did not bring the expected results due to their limited capacity. A ‘new 
migration agreement’ aims at handling this situation. Its elaboration was initiated by 
Italy, mainly because of the high number of migrants going there from Libya. The 
short survey of the ‘new migration agreement’ is of key importance as it is intended 
to offer a long-term solution to the more and more severe migration crisis of the EU. 
It would replace the present policy of ad hoc agreements with a systematic regulation. 
This will be designated to create a legally stable and predictable environment for the 
EU member states and their citizens and for the migrants arriving from beyond the 
12 European Commission: The Schengen area and cooperation, 2008. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT
/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33020 (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
13 European Council: Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32013R0604 (Downloaded 16th February 2019.)
14 European Council: Valletta Summit on migration, 11-12/11/2015. www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/internatio-
nal-summit/2015/11/11-12/ (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
15 Migration Policy Institute: The Paradox of the EU–Turkey Refugee Deal, Migration Policy Institute, 2016. www.mig-
rationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
16 Ministry of Defence of Italy: Mare Nostrum Operation, 2013. www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNost-
rum.aspx (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
17 ANSA News: Frontex Triton operation to ‘support’ Italy’s Mare Nostrum, 2014. www.ansa.it/english/news/2014/10/16/
frontex-triton-operation-to-support-italys-mare-nostrum_ad334b2e-70ca-44ce-b037-4d461ec0d560.html (Down-
loaded: 16.02.2019.)
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borders and to steer the hard manageable migration situation into a regulated frame-
work. The new compact (i.e. the Italian draft serving as the basis for negotiations18) 
basically outlines the steps (propositions) the EU plans to take in order to decrease 
the illegal migration from North Africa, and it clarifies what measures Europe expects 
of the region’s countries (principally Libya) to take in exchange for the propositions. 
The EU propositions for the region’s countries are as follows: new investment projects 
and the establishment of a new EU investment fund for the region’s countries; the 
issuing of “EU–Africa bonds” in order to facilitate the African countries’ access to the 
financial market with the help of the EIB and other European and international finan-
cial organisations; and an increased security cooperation in terms of border control, 
customs, justice and asylum, tallying with the international rules and the regional 
grouping of tasks (regionalisation) with consideration to its cross-border character.
The EU expectations from the countries in the region are as follows: a commitment 
to an effective border control and a decrease of the migrant flow. Hungary completely 
meets the border control requirements of the EU. To sum up, the EU – quasi exter-
nalising the problem – wants to get migration restrained by ‘coaxing’ the countries 
of origin into cooperation. In exchange for stricter border control, cooperation, and 
readmission of illegal migrants, Europe offers the provision of legal (circular) migration 
opportunities in addition to financial and technical aid for the development of border 
defence. A further important detail is that the possible success of the cooperation 
would be rewarded by the EU with economic development measures by way of new 
European investment projects and EU–Africa bonds, which would, in the long run, help 
stabilise the region’s countries struggling at present with severe economic problems. 
In theory, the plan looks impressive, but the question is: as long as there is no stable 
and single central government in Libya, who will carry out the tasks of the compact 
pertaining to partner countries, and, in the absence of a strong and legitimate central 
power who could the EU start negotiations with? The method, which was more or 
less proven in the case of Turkey governed by strong hands, cannot work successfully 
in a country with such a deficient state system like Libya.
We can say that the establishment of a stable Libya (even if with considerable 
EU/NATO support) would be the prerequisite for the elimination of the Central 
Mediterranean migration crisis. For the lack of a strong central government, there is 
simply no entity in today’s Libya which would be able to efficiently roll up the human 
trafficking network active in the country’s territory. The establishment of Libyan unity, 
however, is a very sensitive and complex process for historical and social structural 
reasons. It can be supported from the outside, but it cannot be enforced. In the case 
of Libya, the prerequisite for the (at least partial) implementation of any migration 
agreement is the establishment of a stable government, so the negotiations on 
migration must be preceded by a programme of state-establishing character which 
aims at the stabilisation and capacity enhancement of the state system. A ‘migration 
agreement’ plan is now being outlined, but it seems premature from the EU, as it 
would expect Libya to take significant steps before the establishment of a capable 
18 The Government of Italy: Migration Compact: Contribution to an EU strategy for external action on migration, s. a. 
www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/immigrazione_0.pdf (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
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subject, i.e. government. To recognise this is of key importance, not only for the EU, 
but also for the whole region, since a Somalia-like fallen state on the outskirts of 
Europe would bring disastrous consequences in the long run to both the EU and to 
the neighbouring countries of Libya alike.19
Both the culture and civilisation where the migrants and refugees come from are 
different from ours. A tribal society, be it the background of those arriving from 
Afghanistan or countries in the Middle East or in Northern Africa, makes it difficult 
or even impossible for these people to adapt to our Western type society and civili-
sation. Some of them will be successful in meeting the requirements of integration, 
some of them will fail to do so.20
The Churches play a big role in migration handling, like the Holy See. The Holy 
See is in connection with numbers of international organisations that are affected in 
handling migration crisis. Namely, with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and 
with the International Organization for Migration. The Apostolic Holy See became 
the full member of the latter in December, 2011 during the papacy of Benedict XVI. 
The International Organization for Migration had been in close relations with the 
Catholic Church before, especially with those Catholic organisations that took part 
in handling the migration crisis.21
Helping Syrian Christians by the Hungarian Government’s 
Programme Hungary Helps
Hungary has financed the rebuilding of schools, hospitals, and houses in Iraq and Syria 
through the programme Hungary Helps. Hungary secures higher education oppor-
tunities in Hungarian universities for young Middle Eastern and African persecuted 
Christians. Through the Hungary Helps programme, with 505 million Forints (one 
Euro is about 320 Forint), Hungary supports a Syrian humanitarian initiative called 
Open Hospitals.22 The support of the Open Hospitals project is the newest one. In the 
Syrian cities which had suffered a lot, in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus we support 
hospitals, which care for the poorest. During the eight-year war in Syria, 54 percent 
of the health infrastructure was destroyed. It results in the fact that today, there are 
more people dying due to the lack of health infrastructure than in the war actions.
19 Gugán (2016): op. cit. 12. 
20 Fischl, Vilmos: The Role of Churches in Hungary in Providing Pastoral Care and Humanitarian Help for Migrants, AARMS, 
17 (2018/2) 18.
21 Ujházi, Lóránd: Amendments to the Governance Structure of the Holy See and Canon Law during the European 
Migration Crisis, American Diplomacy, (2017/12) 1. http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2017/12/amendments-
to-the-governance-structure-of-the-holy-see-and-canon-law-during-the-european-migration-crisis/ (Downloaded: 
16.02.2019.)
22 Azbej Tristan: A magyar kormány elsődleges feladata, hogy a magyar emberek boldogulását segítse, 2019. www.
echotv.hu/hirek/2019/01/23/azbej-tristan-a-magyar-kormany-elsodleges-feladata-hogy-segitse-a-magyar-emberek-
boldogulasat (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
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It is in the quantifiable material interest of Hungarian and European people 
alike to continue a proportionate humanitarian policy beyond the borders of the 
country and the continent. For this reason, Hungary undertook the help of the Syrian 
Christians by the programme Hungary Helps. Supporting e.g. hospitals through the 
Syrian churches also means that the Hungarian Government helps all the Syrian 
people, because hospitals are to be used not only by Christians, but also by Muslims.
The Hungary Helps programme serves as a framework for all international 
humanitarian activities Hungary undertakes in order to help all people in need in the 
developing countries and in crisis zones. One of its (though not exclusive) priorities is 
the protection of persecuted Christians. The reason for that is threefold: humanitarian, 
migration political and identity-based. The most important of the three is the first one: 
the Hungarian Government has recognised that the persecution of Christians is one 
of the most severe humanitarian tragedies of our time. Some 70 percent of religious 
persecutions are targeted at Christians. Still, it does not receive enough attention 
in international politics, diplomacy, or in humanitarian programmes. According to 
statistics, there are at least 80 countries where there are persecutions of Christians, 
but we know only about a few.
Indeed, there are at least 80 countries where Christians suffer genocide-like 
persecutions or other atrocities. They are severely discriminated and their human 
rights, civil liberties, freedom of religion, and freedom of conscience are drastically 
restricted. It concerns 215 million Christians. According to estimates, the number 
in Syria dropped to less than a half of what it was (from 2 million to 800 thousand), in 
Iraq it dropped to one-fifth (from 1.5 million to 300 thousand).23 The Islamic State 
aimed at abolishing Christian communities from the Middle East. ISIS did not manage 
to do so, but now migration is taking young people who would mean the future. There 
is a Hungarian scholarship programme providing European-level training to young 
people with the aim that they should return to their original communities. There are 
about 170 students in Hungary training for professions which will be useful in their 
countries. For instance, Iraqi students study to become engineers in the hydrocar-
bon industry at Miskolc University. The provision of admission is a church letter of 
recommendation to confirm their commitment to their community and homeland. 
The Hungarian donations are launched from Hungary and arrive at the local churches 
without any intermediate stations; they are sent either directly by the treasury or by 
Hungarian charity organisations which help accomplish a project locally. With their 
steady presence, the Hungarian Maltese Charity Service in Syria and the Hungarian 
Interchurch Aid in Iraq are our important partners.24
What can churches do in Hungary? The Church has to perform its task further 
on in the present migration situation in Europe. Migration poses a real challenge for 
Christian communities. It challenges them to answer the question how much they 
are able to receive and handle differences. To receive means to love, to take people 
seriously, to facilitate everybody in being themselves, and to not feel threatened 
23 Magyarok az üldözött keresztényekért, 2018. https://kepmas.hu/nemzeti-kuldetesunk-az-uldozott-keresztenyek-
segitese (Downloaded: 16.02.2019.)
24 Ibid.
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because of their dissimilarity. The Church has to act in solidarity, as it is the mission 
of the Church. The Church runs a range of institutions to support the refugees arriving 
at the borders of Europe. It does not want to replace the state, but it has to react 
to human suffering. However, it must also be acknowledged that every migration 
movement must take place within legal boundaries or else it threatens public order.25
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